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ABSTRACT 
For the last 15 years, significant amount of resources are invested to enhance the security at 
system and network leve), such as firewalls, IDS, anti-virus, etc. IT infrastructure tends to be 
more and more secure than ever before. As an ever-increasing number of businesses move to take 
advantage of the Internet, web applications are becoming more prevalent and increasingly more 
sophisticated, and as such they are critical to almost ali major online busincsses. The very nature 
of web applications, their abilities to collect, process and disseminate information over the 
Internet, exposes thern to rnalicious hackers. How~ver, the traditional security solutions such as 
firewall, network and host IDS, do not provide comprehensive protection against the attacks 
common in the web applications. 
The thesis concentrates on the research of an advanced intrusion detection framework. An 
intrusion detection framework was designed which works along with any custom w~b application 
to collect and analy:ze HTTP traffic with various advanced algorithms. Two intrusion detection 
algorithms arc tested and adoptecl in the framework. Pattern Matching is the most populat· 
intrusion detection technology adopted by most of the commercial intrusion detection system. 
Bchavior Modeling is a new technolo&,ry that can dynamically adapt the detection algorithms in 
accordance with the applicatioq behavior. The combination of the two intrusion technologies has 
dramatically reduced fa lse positive and false negative alarms. Moreover, a Servlet filter~based 
Web Agent is used to capture HTTP request. An isolated Response Module is developed to 
execute pre-defined action according to the analysis result. A database is involved to provide 
persistence support for the framework . Also, severa! simulation experiments are developed for 
eva luating the efficiency of detecting capability. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the motivation and objective are reviewed following by an overview of the 
skeleton of the thesis. A brief introduction of the project is included in this section . 
1.1 Motivations 
Information security is serious issue in today's ex.tensively interconnected cyber space. 
Unauthorized network intrusions and computer-related fraud initiated abuses have dramatically 
increased due to the popularity of Internet and the implicit anonymity of network users. The 
commercial sectors, academie institution, government even individual desktop users are now 
victimized at risk from the increasing network attacks. 
Since most firewalls are effective in protecting against common attacks at the 
network-layer, the target of attacks bas changed to application-layer, where monetary return can 
be achieved. Meanwhile, operation system vendors have kept patching up published and 
unpublished vulnerabilities, so the weakness of Web application becomes the easy target of 
attacks. 
In response to this emerging phenomenon, many solutions have been proposed to enhance 
application security, among which Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) is the most effective and 
meaningful one. 
Lacking the standardization and the supports from the operating system vendors, IDS 
solutions introduced their unique approaches and algorithms to detect intrusions. However, the 
proposai of common protocols and application programming interface are required so that the 
research of intrusion detection can share information and resources. 
With the help of A11ificial Intelligence (AI), data mining and other advanced algorithms, 
academie research communities attempted to develop advanced technologies to detect intrusions 
in large-distributed environments. However, little effort has been invested in application intrusion 
detection, which would be able to detect attacks targeted at business logic instead of static 
protocol stacks. Thus, the development of a flexible and easy-to-implement Web 
application-specifie Intrusion Detection Framework is more desirable at present. 
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Additionally, with the popularlty of Java technology and J2EE standard, proposai of a 
platfonn-independent Intrusion Detection Framework for Web application becomcs an emerging 
issue. Therefore, the project is conceived and designed to provide an effective and efficient web 
application security framework with advanced algorithms. 
1.2 Objective 
The main objective of this thesis is to propose a common Intrusion Detection Framework 
for Web application, which would be able to work with any custom-built web applications. With 
advanced framework architecture and effective detection algorithms, this framework can process 
various security-related data, detect and prevent intrusion effectively with Jess fal se negative and 
false positive. 
This J2EE-compatible framework follows the thought of modular architecture design 
methodology. Tt consists of the following four pmts: 
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• A filter-based Web Agent is developed. The agent collects network traffic, sends the 
captured information to the Web Intrusion Detection System (WebiDS) for intrusion 
analysis, and receives instruction message from WebiDS to take appropriate actions against 
the network packets. 
• Advanced intrusion detection algorithms, pattern matching and behavior modeling, are 
developed. They fonn the core component ofWebiDS, Analysis Engine. 
- - - ------ ----------- --
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• Another critical component of WebiDS is Response Module. lt is responsiblc for execution 
of specifie actions determined by the analysis rcsult. The module might filter out intrusion 
payload wh en an attack is detected, or se nd instructive messages to Web Agent. 
• Databuse module is included in order to provide persistent storage for the WebiDS. 
1.3 Thesis Contribution 
This thesis proposes an Intrusion Detection Framework for Web application with advanced 
detection algorithms. The major contributions of this thesis are summarized as the followings: 
• A complete Intrusion Detection Framework is proposed. With this framework, various 
security relevant data can be collected and analyzed by one system. And the framework is 
highly adaptive to allow any new intrusion detection algorithm to be conveniently deployed 
as plug-ins, since it adopts designing concept based on modular architecture and it is strictly 
compatible with J2EE development standard. 
• With the introduction of Servlet Filter technology, the job of data collection becomes easier. 
It captures raw network traftic and takes appropriate actions against the packet based on the 
instructive message from Analysis Engine. 
• Pattern Matching Algorithm and Behavior Modeling Algorithm are the advanced algorithms 
developed in this project. The combination of two algorithms decreases false negative and 
positive efficiently. 
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1.4 Thesis Organization 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. 
Cha,pter 2 briefly describes background information. lt discusses the current issues 
associated with the security of Web application and the reason that we have to introduce 
Intrusion Detection System to prevent attacks coming from outside network. Then, comparison 
between Intrusion Detection System and Intrusion Prevention System is reviewed. At last, 
relevant terminologies and information of IDS are reviewed. 
Chapter 3 presents the overall architecture of IDS framework developed in this project. 
Relationships of the components and primary functions of each module are revealed. 
From chapter 4 to chapter 7, the design details of the Intrusion Detection Framework for 
Web application are explained . 
Chapter 4 concentrates on a design ofFilter-based Web Agent. Background information on 
Servlet Filter technology is reviewed briefly. Then the detailed implementations are revealed. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the intrusion detection algorithms and implementations. A prevalent 
pattern-matching algorithm is discussed; a more advanced and effective behaviour-modeling 
methodology follows. 
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In chapter 6 and chapter 7, other two modules in the framework, Response Module and 
Database are revealed . In chapter 6, design of Response Module is delivered. Chapter 7 presents 
the details about database schema and database-relevant technologies, including data access 
supported by Spring-framework and Hibernate. 
Experiment result and evaluation of the project are the primary content of cht~pter 9, where 
severa( case studies arc presented. Chapter 10 concludes this thesis and points out sorne future 
work. 
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CHAPTER2 
RELATED WORK 
First of ali, background of information security (i.e. Web application security 
vulnerabilities) is examined. Subsequently, the need for Intrusion Detection System can be 
discussed. The debate on the "IDS is dead" is discussed here tao. 
In the Internet era, information systems in the government and commercial sectors are 
distributed and highly interconnected via local area network and wide area network. These 
networks provide potential avenues for attacks mounted by hackers and other adversaries. 
Therefore, the methodology for protecting the 'privacy and improve security leve! of these 
interconnected computes in the Internet is a significant issue. 
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2.1 Goal of Network Security 
A paper wri.tten by Donn Parker [7] out! ines six elements of security that must be engraved 
on mind of each security administrator. We think it is worth evaluating any website by 
determining how it complies with these six elements. 
1. Availability: the system must be available for use when the users need it. 
2. Utility: the system, and data on the system, must be useful for a purpose. Similarly, each web 
component must have specifie pre-defined function. 
3 . Integrity: the system and its data must be complete, and in an available condition . 
4. Authenticity: the system must be able to verify the identity of users, and the users should be 
able to verify the identity of the system. 
5. Confidentiality: only the owner of the data should know private data. The protected data 
cannat be disclosed in unauthorized fashion. 
6. Possession: the owner of the system must be guaranteed that the system is under his control. 
Losing control of a system to a malicious user affects the security of the system for ali other 
users. 
2.2 Why We Need Intrusion Detection System 
The reasons that we need IDS can be concluded into followin g three points: 
• The inherent Vlllnerabilities in the traditional network security hierarchy demonstrate that it 
is impossible to ensure network security without any external protection. 
Firewalls cannot guarantee 100 percent security. 
• The prevalent flaws in Web application also declare that the introduction of intrusion 
detection system is desirable. 
2.2.1 Traditional Network Security Approaches 
Improvement on Authentication 
ln aim to distinguish network machine from each other and deliver messages, a source and 
destination address for the network packet are required. A machine that claims to have a 
particular network address might not be telling the truth. An attacker can disable one of the 
machines and inwersonate that machine using IP address impersonation [26]. Thereforç, the 
authentication only basee! on address is unre liable. The open nature of the Internet a!so makes 
most of attacks possible. If packets are sent unencrypted between systems, then an adversary 
somewhere along the path can sniff the network and read information contained in the packets 
fairly easily. 
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To improve the security oflP packages in a network, the IPSEC (IP Security) standard was 
introduced. IPSEC provides two alternatives called Authentication H~ader (AH) and 
Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP). AH is sufficient to prevent impersonation of IP headers 
and IP address. ESP can provide privacy, integrity, or both. Naturally, IPSEC is s(O\.ver than 
unprotected JP traffic because of the additional path lengths introduced for cryptographie 
computations . 
Improvement on Access Control 
Network communications also require some forms of access control. It could be classified 
into two levels. One is application levet access control, and the other is network levet access 
control, or packet filter access control [26] . Application access control is application-oriented, 
and can be configured independently. Packet fil ter access control works at a leve! of the network 
stack and control the traffic based on the permission rules. Thus, packet filter operates at a lower 
network layer than the application. The biggest drawback of packet filter is that it can operate 
only on the fields that appear in the network packets. If access control decisions require 
higher-level support, these decisions are not available until they reach the receiving destination. 
Firewalls are the most popular and prevalent commercial solutions protecting the network. 
Based on the configuration, packets meeting the çriterion are forwarded. Those that fait the check 
are dropped . M01·eover, almost every firewall today is equipped with a mechanism to provide 
secure IP traffic based on the IPSEC standard. 
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Improvement on Encryption Techniques 
Netscape® introduced SSL (Secured Sockets Layer) protocol for transmitting private 
documents via the Internet. SSL works by using a public key for encryption and a private key for 
decryption. Becm)se SSL encryption d~pends heavily on keys, people nonnally measure the 
effectivcness or strength of SSL encryption in terms of key lenf,rth. Now, 128-bit encryption is 
recognized by the most makers of Web browser. 
Based on the past history of improvements in computer performance, security experts 
expect that the Brute-Force attack could not crack the 128-bit cncryption for at !east the next ten 
years. However, the potential threat is still there. 
2.2.2 Firewall Is Not Enough 
Now we have robust enough firewall. It provides better access control and supports more 
reliable IPSEC standard. However, the network is still unsecured. For example, in the year 2000 
the so-called Distributed Deniai of Service (DDoS) attacks blocked severa! major commercial 
sites, including Yahoo and CNN, although they were protected by firewalls. The inherent 
limitations that firewalls have make them insufficient for intrusion detection and prevention. 
These weaknesses can be summarized as follows: 
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• Firewalls çan be compromised or bypassed, and do little to protect against attacks initiated 
from insider. Moreover, a hacker çan easily exploit a bug that already exists in the firewall 
implementation. 
• Many inside people use modems to connect to the outside world from the secure network, 
and unwanted traffic can enter through the modem connections. Thus, firewalls a tone are 
not enough to fulfill security needs . 
• Traditional firewalls are designed for improving security of network layer instead of 
application layer. They allow certain packets to pass through or else disable access for 
pre-defined data flow path. However, many of the latest infiltrations of networks occur 
through the firewall us ing the ports that the firewall allows by design or default. 
• With the invention of SSL, intruqers can pass right through network firewalls and go 
directly to the ai:Jplication, because they are using encrypted connections. Even deep-packet 
inspection is powerless to detect simple attacks delivered in this way. 
• Human intervention is required to decide how to control traffic and configure the firewall 
to accept or deny packets. A single security policy established for the wrong reasons can 
lead to a system being vulnerable to outside attackers. Therefore, configuration of network 
firewalls is a complex and a sensitive task to Web admin istrator. 
• Firewalls do not know what happens once the traffic gets through the firewall. 
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2.2.3 Security Vulnerabilities of Web Application 
Today, there are various security vulnerabilities in Web applications, such as HTTP header, 
HTML, scripts, and cookies. Web-based attacks utilize web sites to send spam email that blocks 
inboxes, and mines confidential information. According to recent reports by Gartner [20], over 
70 percent of Web attacks occur at the application-layer. Those vulnerabilities in Web 
applications become the primary attack targets in the network. The vulnerabilities related to the 
Web application can be categorized as follows: 
• IT Infrastructure Vulnerabilities: 
Exploiting IT infrastructure vulnerabilities is probably the easiest way to attack an 
application. Thousands of known vulnerabilities exist in the basic components that form 
integrated Internet environments. Attackers, keeping themselves up to date with ali 
published vulnerabilities, often find it is extremely easy to take advantage of them. The 
best well-known flaw of Web application server was in the IlS 4.0/5.0 developed by 
Microsoft® . 
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• Software Vulnerabilities: 
Designing and maintaining a secure web application are tedious tasks that require constant 
quality assurance and security analysis. Application developers often deploy third-party 
software and customize it to their specifie needs. As a result, "holes" in the deployed 
software and en·ors created during the customization process bring serious vulnerabilities 
in the final application production, due to lacking of security knowledge and experience, 
Additionally, insecure application development patterns and practices used by developers 
might cause inevitable mistakes. For instance, any user can manually change hidden 
parameters in HTML documents and then submit the modified va lues to the remote server. 
• Database Vulnerabilities: 
The database is not only the core components of most app lications but also the most 
attractive target of attacks. Various vulnerabilities in database have been published in these 
years. Other than those well-known problems, SQL injection or other database-related 
attacks could easi ly deJete, modify, or retrieve database records, where Web appliçations 
have access to a database directly. 
2.3 Overview of Intrusion Detection System 
From the above analysis, we have to admit that we need other instrument to guarantee the 
security ofiT environment. So, the next question is which one we will choose to protect the Web 
application, Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System, or both? Before we jump 
to the discussion, the terminologies related with Intrusion Detection System have to be reviewcd. 
2.3.1 Terminology 
Intrusion 
An intrusion can be defined as [Heady: 21]: "An intrl!sion is any set o[actions thot qttempt 
to compromise the integrity, contldentiality. or availability of a resource." 
It can also be defined as a violation of security po licy [12]. In this regard, the definition of 
an intrusion may be different for varions organizations according to their policies. For example, a 
login at midnight is considered as a kind of intrusion in many companies, regard)ess of whether 
the connection is from inside or outside the physical perirneters ofthe organization. 
Intrusion Detection System 
Intrusion detection is the process of identifying and responding to malicious activities 
targeted at computing and networking resources. 
15 
An Intrusion Detection System, or IDS for short, helps computer systems deal with or 
prepare for attacks by analyzing gathered information of security problems. An Intrusion 
Detection System usually includes three components: data collector, data analyzer and responder. 
A data collector captures security-related data such as system logs, network packets, audit 
data, etc. A data analyzer examines if violation of security policy or exploitation occurs. Upon 
detecting suçh exploitation, the responder component triggers an alarm, takes appropriate actions, 
and saves the evidence of the intrusion for further analysis. 
In sh01t, Intrusion Detection System cannot prevent the malicious attacks, but it can help 
administrator detect intruders when they enter Web application. Thus, IDS can help stop hackers 
before they get too far. 
2.3.2 IDS or IPS 
Now let us face the debate on Intrusion Detection System sparked by the assessment of 
Gartner [20]. The report declarecl that intrusion detection systems would be dead and predicted 
the market for such products would be gone by 2005. Moreover, the report also announced that 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is the answer to most security issues. 
Intrusion Prevention System, or IPS for short, is an active intrusion prevention system. Jt 
can detect malicious information within normal network traffic and block the offend ing traffic 
automatically before it does any damage rather than sim ply raise an a lert. 
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Thus, the biggest difference between passive IDS and IPS is that once malicious activity is 
detected, the IPS has the ability to take active defensive actions. However, we do not think IPS 
will take over passive IDS, because the following reasons: 
1. It is really difficult to locate the position of passive IDS in the network. But IPS, just like 
firewalls, is relatively easy to find. 
2. Suppose we need more detailed network activities to do correlation. With an IPS we have 
to consider thoroughly, because performance can be an issue if we want to get a huge 
amount of these information. If we choose passive IDS, we have Jess risk of performance 
impact. 
3. Since an IPS combines the blocking capabilities of a firewall with the deep·packet 
inspection of IDS together, the configuration of an IPS is very difficult. But IDS is more 
flexible to make changes fast. 
Moreover, IPS çloes not have any açlvantage over active IDS, Today, many of the IDS 
vendors are adding active response capabilities to their products. The concept behind this strategy 
is that the IDS can detect an attacker and then move to stop his attack. An active IDS responds to 
the suspicious activity by Jogging off an intruder or by reprogramming the firewall to block 
network traffic from the suspected malicious source [9]. In the other word, both active IDS and 
IPS have the capability to prevent the attack from being successful. 
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Additionally, a lot of people support the point that there is no conflict between IDS and 
IPS. Use an IPS to prevent what can reliably be prevented, use an IDS to detect the more difficult 
to prevent attacks and collect additional forensic data. 
According to the comment stated above, we do not believe IPS is the way of the future. 
And we do not think IPS will take over IDS, as IPS does not bring more extra functionality. 
Actually, both IDS and IPS share common problems, i.e. sjgnature update. 1-Iowever, it is 
important to remember that no single security deviee could stop ali attacks ali the time. 
2.4 Classification of IDS 
At present, from the techniques that a sy~tem uses, intrusion detection systems cun be 
categorized into two broad classes: anomaly detection system and misuse detection system [1 0] 
[15]. From the domain that a system protects, intrusion detection systems can also be categorized 
into three classes: host-based Intrusion Detection System, network-based Intrusion Detection 
System and Hybrid Intrusion Detection System. 
2.4.1 Host-based IDS, Network-based IDS and Hybrid IDS 
Host-based IDS 
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Host-based IDS employs the host's audit trait (such as audit logs, applic<ltion log, system 
information) as the main source of input for detecting intrusions. HIDS can be installed on many 
different types of deviees, such as servers, workstations and notebook computers. Although the 
HIDS is limited in scope and cannot detect simultaneous attacks against multiple hosts, it can be 
powerful tool for analyzing a possible attack by recording what the attacker did . A 1-IIDS usually 
provides much more detailed and relevant information than a NIDS. 
Network-based IDS 
The traditional HIDS was designed to detect intrusions in a single host. As the focus of 
çomputing shifted from mainframe environments to distributed networks of servers, it has 
considered intrusion not only of single hosts but of networks as weil. NIDS builds its detection 
mechanisms to monitor network traffic. It can be installed on active network elements, for 
example on routers. NIDS utilizes the source and destination IP address to deduce 
security-related parameters, like the number of tot.al connection arrivais in a certain period of 
ti me, the number of packets to/from a ce1iain machine, or the arrivai ti me between packets. These 
parameters can be used to detect port scans or DoS (Deniai of Service) attempts. 
Hybrid IDS 
Hybrid IDS is a combination of Network-based IDS and Host-based IDS. Thus, Hybrid 
IDS would monitor network traffic, and monitor the host sources that a HIDS would. For 
example, Prelude [18] is a typical open source hybrid IDS framework. 
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2.4.2 Misuse Intrusion 
Misuse Detection [22] (or Signature Detection) attempts to encode knowledge about 
attacks as well-defined patterns and monitors for the occurrence of these patterns. Signatures are 
patterns for detecting known attacks or misuse symptoms. "Individualpatterns can be composed 
of single events. sequences of events. thresholds .of events. or general regular expressions in 
which AND and OR operators are al/owed [267. " They may be simple as in the case of character 
string matching a single term or command, or complexas in the case of state transition written as 
a formai mathematical expression. One technique used to satisfy this may be having rules that 
describe the system state changes, i.e. ST AT [ 13] . 
The rule-based system or signature-based system monitors the system resources and logs to 
match attack signature. When an attack is detected, an alarm is triggered. For example, an 
attempt to exploit a XSS (Cross-site Scripting) intrusion can be caught by examining if there is 
JavaScript or HTML in the parameter field . This can be accomplished using a pattern matching 
approach. Therefore, the accuracy of the misuse intrusion detection is considered good, but its 
completeness requires that the attack knowledge base should be updated regularly. In the other 
word, misuse intrusion detection usually has low false positive, but high false negative. At recent, 
SNORT [19] becomes the most popular open-source, signature-based network intrusion detection 
system. 
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In the Section 5.1, we discuss a Pattern Matching Engine. lt follows the natvre of misuse 
detection technique, and realizes a pattern-matching algorithm. 
Advantages of Mis use D<;tection 
• Misuse detection concerns only the system data items related to pre-defined pattern, does 
not need to exhaustively analyze aU system events, thereby reducing system overhead . 
Meanwhile, administrator can choose customized patterns for different Web applications. 
• Mi suse detection matches system events with cl earl y defined patterns of vulnerabilities and 
exploitations. This technique is very efficient and effective to detect well-known attacks. 
Disadvantages of Mis use Detection 
• It is hard to collect ali the required information for detecting ali known attack, and keep it 
abreast with new vulnerabi lities. The construction of signature database is a 
time-consuming process and prone to mistake. And it is the most critkal drawback of 
misuse intrusion detection. 
• The misuse detection approach can be highly accurate, but it cannot detect intrusions that 
fall outside its predefined list of ru les describing known vulnerabilities and exploitations. 
• A complicated intrusion scenario is very difficult to abstract for generating accurate 
intrusion signatures . In addition, it is extremely difficult, even impossible to construct 
intrusion signatures to accommodate ail variants of intrusion scenarios. This is the reason 
that causes the misuse detection generates low false positive, but high false negative. 
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2.4.3 Anomaly Detection 
Anomaly Intrusion Detection is a prevalent approach, which is based on the detection of 
the anomalous behaviour or the abnormal use of computer resource [2]. 
A profile that describes the normality of the monitored system and/or users is always 
required for anomaly detection. Anomaly detection systems, for example, IDES [30], flag 
observed activities that deviate s ignificantly from the established normal profiles as anomalies or 
possible intrusions. 
For various kinds of subjects in an anomaly detection system, such as sessions, users, 
groups, programs and network traffics, a number of measures and attributes are used to describe 
the normality. Depending on the source of these input data, anomaly detection is divided into 
host-based anomaly detection and network-based anomal y detection [ 4]. 
Network-based anomaly detection focuses on the packets that are sent over the network 
and monitors the flow of packets. Source and destination IP addresses, connection start and end 
t ime are parameters used to summary network traffics. 
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Like host~based IDS, ho~t-based anomaly detection concentrates on activities at hosts. 
Host-base.d anomaly detection works by establishing "profiles" oftypicalnetwork activities, such 
as login time, number of failure logins, CPU usage, etc. An anomaly detection system uses these 
profiles to monitor current user's activity and to compare them to detect anomalous behaviour. 
Whenever a user's cutTent activity deviates from profile significantly, the activity is considered 
as a possible or potential attack. 
In the Section 5.2, we propose a Bebaviour Modeling Engine. It is an implementation of a 
host-based anomaly detection system. A behaviour-modeling algorithm, which extends anomaly 
detection technique, is developed in the engine. 
Advantages of Anomaly Detection 
• The most significant advantage of anomaly intrusion approach is the ability to detect novel 
attacks against variants of known attacks, and deviations from normal usage of programs, 
regardless of wh ether the source is a privileged user or an unauthorized external user. 
• The anomaly detection technique has the capability to determine the Jegitimate profile 
according to user activities or program activities without any intervention of human 
security expert. 
Disadvantage of Anomaly Detection 
• The high false alarm rat~ is generally cited as the main drawback of the statistical anomaly 
detection. The reason for this is that the entire scope of normal behaviour of a computer 
system or user may not be covered during the learning period. Also the constantly 
behaviour changes make it difficu)t to accurately grasp the condition of a normal 
environment in real time, 
• To the statistical anomaly detection, it is difficult to determine a threshold, which is a value 
to evaluate if the activity should be classified as an intrusion or a normal action . If the 
threshold is too low, it may generate many false positive alarms; on the contrary, if the 
threshold is too high, the number of false negative raise. lt is relatively easy for an intruder 
to trick the statistical analysis unit into accepting malicious attack as normal activity by 
gradually varying his actions over time. Consequently, setting thresholds for indicating 
intrusive events requires experience. 
• The anomaly intrusion detection method only identifies activities as anomalies or 
determines the current system is in anomalous status; it cannot distinctly indicate what 
happens to the system or what the hacker has done to the system. The shortcoming results 
in a high false positive rate. 
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Since every intrusion detection technique has advantages and disadvantages, Intrusion 
Detection System proposed in the thesis adopts a hybrid approach to detect attacks or 
exploitations. A Pattern Matching Engine can drop a request if it matches well-known malicious 
attack pattern, and a Behaviour Modeling Engine can drop the input if it falls outside the normal 
profile. 
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CHAPTER3 
INTRUSION DETECTION FRAMEWORK 
ln this chapter, the proposed Intrusion Detection Framework is discussed, followed by a 
short description of overall development approach. Finally, relationships among components in 
the proposed Intrusion Detection Framework are analyzed. Each component in this framework 
will be described with more details in the following chapters. 
3.1 Description 
The proposed Intrusion Detection Framework in this project is in compliance with the 
Common Intrusion Detection Framework issued by CIDF [5] completely. 
• Filter-based Web Agent is used to collect raw HTTP request (note that only request 
information is collected and analyzed). 
• The intrusion detection approaches including Pattern. Matching and Behavior Mode ling are 
designed and implemented in Analysis Engine. 
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• An isolated Response Module is developed to carry out responding actions. 
• A Database is involved to provide persistence to the entire system. 
The research on the Intrusion Detection Framework is completed in J2SE 1.5.0 
environment. Some modern development tools and technologies, like Tomcat, Spring-framework 
and Hibernate are employed to meet the requirements of design and programming. 
3.2 Relationships of IDS Components 
The fn)mework oflntrusion Detection System can be illustrated with the following figure: 
Gets Response Command Gets Analysis Rule/Profile 
• '~ l' 
Gets Action Command ---' ,:,.g Response Module 
Figure 3-1 Relationships of Intrusion Detection Framework Components 
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Web Agent 
This component could be integrated with target Web application as a pluggable module. It 
has the following features: 
• Gathers security-related raw HTTP traffic. Stores the collected data in the XML format. 
• Sends the collected data in XML to Analysis Engine. 
• Executes responding action (drop, pass, etc.) according to instruction received from 
Response Module. 
Analysis Engine 
Once Analysis Engine receives the collected request from Web Agent, it analyzes if there 
is malicious content in the request or not. Since some analysis patterns or profiles might be stored 
in the Database, Analysis Engine retrieves them from the Database during the pcriod of 
initialization or at runtime. 
Response Module 
According to the analysis result concluded in the Analysis Engine, Response Module 
carries out pre-defined response actions. If an attack event is found, the collected data with 
malicious attacks will be inserted into the Database as intrusion evidence for further analysis and 
reporting. And an alarm must be raised to draw administration 's attention . Moreover, instruction 
to drop the malicious request must be return to Web Agent. 
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Database 
Database component provides persistent storage for entire Web Intrusion Detection 
Framework. As the illustration in Figure 3-1 , Analysis Engine retrieves configuration and profile 
information from database for intrusion analysis, and Response Module saves malicious request 
to database as security log. 
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CHAPTER4 
WEB AGENT 
In this chapter, implementation details of Web Agent are discussed. Since Web Agent is 
developed with Servlet Filter technology in J2EE environment, some background related with 
filter technology are mentioned briefly. Second, a draft on a centralized character filtering 
technology is introduced, with the consideration of that attacks could bypass intrusion detection 
system by utilizing various charaç:ter encoding. Finally, a metbod to nonnalize HTTP request data 
into an analyzable format is revealed. 
4.1 Description 
Web Agent is a data collector. Ail HTTP data to be analyzed in the Analysis Engine is 
çaptured by Web Agent. Th us, Web Agent is designed with following princip les: 
• Gathers security-related data. 
• Provides a centralized cbaracter set filter for ali input stream. 
• Stores the normalized HTTP request to a file in XML format. 
• Sends the XML file to Analysis Engine ofWebiDS. 
• Gets instruction from Response Module in WebiDS and executes correspondent action (i.e. 
drop the user request or deliver the request). 
Web Agent gathers security-related data, including network packets data and 
system-related data. Network packets are the data transmitted through the network, which are 
then collected by the network traffic monitor or sniffer. Generally speaking, network packets data 
involves such information like source and destination address, source and destination application 
port numbers, types of packet, options of the protocols, and the content of the packets. The 
network packets data play an important role in Intrusion Detection Systems, since they provide 
detailed and valuable information of network activities. 
In the Intrusion Detection Framework covered in the thesis, not only the client request is 
normalized, but also some system-related data (i.e. application!D and agentJD) are included in 
the XML files for distributed deployment scenario. Association relationship between Web 
application and Web Agent is very important. For example, one Web Agent could provide data 
collection service for multiple applications deployed in the same web server. This information 
should be associated accurately when administrator deploys Intrusion Detection System to 
specifie application, so that the Analysis Engine could differentiate web applications being 
monitored . 
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4.2 Considerations of Web Agent 
A number of design requir~m.ents for Web Agent have been taken into account in advance. 
They are summ.arized as following three aspects: 
Modularization: 
The primary task of Web Agent is to gather network data, send the collected information to 
WebiDS where further intrusion analysis would be carried out. And it must execute some actions 
(i.e. drop or pass) according to the action instruction received from WebiDS. From the view of 
functionality, the job of Web Agent is associated with Web application closely. From the view of 
modularization, Web Agent should be an isolated component, which can be embedded in the 
Web application easily. 
N ormalization: 
The volume of network traffic is extremely huge, and it includes a lot of irrelevant 
information . Sorne measures must be taken to reduce the size of these data and eliminate 
non-security-related information before Web Agent sends them to Analysis Engine. With these 
considerations in mind, a centralized input filter routine is adopted. A suitable canonicat fonn 
must be chosen and ali user requests should be standardized into that fonn before any intrusion 
analysis is performed. Moreover, in order to meet the requirement of further information 
processing, it is necessaty to normal ize the infonnation into a common format. 
---------------~---------------------------------------
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Effîciency; 
In order to meet the requirements of network traJfic capturing and real-time detection, Web 
Agent must collect network pÇJckets efficiently with the least system overhead and time 
consuming. 
4.3 Filter-based Web Agent 
In this project, a filter-based Web Agent is employed to capture HTTP request and rece ive 
response from WebiDS. 
4.3.1 Feasibility Study 
Serlvet Filter 
Servlet Filter is a useful and important technique, which is introduced since Servlet 2J, 
and it çan be defined as follow: 
"A ti!ter is an abject that can transform the header and content (or both) of a req~1est or 
r.§.NJonse. !1lJ:_ It is a web component that intercepts requests and responses, or manipulates the 
data that is being exchanged between client and server. "As a result, the critical difference that 
makes {ilters different from other web components in that jilters usually do not themselves create 
a resp_onse. [27L Jt provides a modular, object-orientated mechanism for encapsulating common 
tasks into pluggable components that are declared via a configuration file and processed 
dynamically [14]. 
Advantagcs of Filter-based Web Agent 
According to the features stated above, we draw the conclusion that Servlç:t filter is 
sufficient to build an efficient Web Agent. The HTTP request can be captured when it pass 
through the filter. After intrusion detection analysis being performed on the request data, the 
reconstructed response is retumed to the user. The filter-based Web Agent has severa! important 
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advantages: 
• Filter-based Web Agent is designed to be a pluggable component within web application. It 
allows the seamless integration of Web Agent with the web application. By encapsulating 
application-processing logic into a single component, filter-based Web Agent defines a 
modular component that can be easily add~d to and removed from the target application 
without any code modification. 
• Filter-based Web Agent is a lightweight solution. It can be invoked by the Servlet container 
to perform data gathering functionality without any impact to other Web components. 
• By means of the modular design of a filter's implementation class and flexible filter 
mapping configuration, a filter can be mapped to any number of web resources in a web 
appLication. Therefore, filter-based Web Agent provides customized data gathering service 
for different web pages. 
• Filter-based Web Agent is platform-independent as long as a Servlet container is available. 
This feature allows it to be easily deployed in any compliant J2EE environment. 
4.3.2 The Implementation 
The fo llowing class diagram ill ustrates the re lationships among classes contained in the 
Web Ag~nt component. Where, the job tbat normalization package defmes is to normal ize HTTP 
request. Wc will discuss it in the Section 4.5. Moreover, the detail about the centralized input 
fi lter, Decoder, is going to be reviewed in the nex~ section. 
1 
webagent 
9 
<<realize>> , Gets XML Document 
Ht tplnfof ilter 
-fil terConfig : FilterConfig 
+ init(fil terConfig : FilterConfig): void 
+doFilter(req: ServletRequest, res: ServletResponse, chain: FilterChain) : void 
+ toString(): String 
+destory(): void 
_.- ----? 
Check Input 
1 
normalization 
Decoder 
-transferXr'lLDoc(session: HttpSession, req: HttpServletRequest): String +decode(message : String): String 
~ Gets Http Connection 
' v 
Ht tpConnectionUtil 
r-~----------------------------------~ r--- -----·------- ----------------------~ 
+getConnection(uri: String) : HttoURLConnection 
+receivervlessaqe(conn : HttgURLConnection) 
+sendrvlessaqe(conn: HttpURLConnection, message : String): void 
Figure 4-1 WebAgent Class Diagram 
The imp lementation of fi lter-based Web Agent focuses on a Sevlet Filter component, 
HttplnfoFilter. It uses the functionality offered by other objects to perform data collection and 
normalization task. The programming details are shown in the following figure, Figure 4-2. 
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1. Il Web Agent sends XML document to and reccives rnessage from WeblDS 
2. String receivedMsg = this.transferXMLDoc(session, request); 
3. 
4. Il Web Agent's request doe$ not pass analysis ofWebiDS 
S. if (!receivedMsg.equalsignoreCase("OK")) 
6. 
7. 
8. Il Create a writer from an output stream that writes to this response. 
9. PrintWriter out= 
1 O. new PrintWriter(new Bu1feredOutputStream(response.get0utputStream())); 
11. Il Output el'l'or comment 
12. out.println(receivedMsg); 
13. out.flush(); 
14. out.close(); 
15. } 
16. else Il Otherwise 
17. { 
18. 
19. chain.doFilter(request, response); 
20. } 
Figure 4-2 Programming Details of doFilter() 
In line 2, a private method transferXMLDoc is invoked. This method requests the service 
provided by normalization package to get standardized XML document. Then it sends the data to 
WebiDS with the support of HTTP connection provider, HttpConnectionUtil. Also 
transjerXMLDoc is designed to receive the action instruction from WebiDS when intrusion 
analysis decision bas been made. The left part of doFilter (!ines 4-20) executes the received 
action intrusion. If no intrusion is found or the received instruction is "OK", client will receive 
hislher requested page. Otherwise, client might receive a customized error page. 
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4.4 Centralized Character Filter 
The responsibility of a centralized character filter is to process system-sensitive and 
security-sensitive characters . The activities that centralized character filter perfonns include: 
• Canonicalize the sensitive character from one form to another. 
• Filter out illegal character sequences. 
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Moreover, it has to be designed as a centralized component. In the other word, ali fonns of 
HTTP request must be processed by this filter. And only the HTTP request after being filtered by 
this character filter can be utilized as input stream for further processing. So when a HTTP 
request is captured, it will be canonicalized once and then utilized by other WebiDS components. 
4.4.1 Why a Centralized Character Filter Is Needed 
The reasons that we need centralized character filter include the following two points: 
• A character sequence might have specifie meaning at different processing points . Since we 
store HTTP request in the XML format, some characters (i.e. less-than sign "<") are 
sensitive characters we have to consider. 
• Some attacks are based on the variant of character encoding. Recognition of the malformed 
character format is the most efficient method against these attacks . Moreover, generation of 
attack pattern could be much easier if the captured HTTP request could be canonicalized 
into a uniform form . 
Character Encoding and UTF -8 
In order to use a standard and canonicat character set to represent ali available characters, 
people perceive the concept of character encoding. Now there are two popular 
character-encoding standards, the Unicode Standard [31] and the International standard ISO 
10646 [32]. 
The Unicode Standard defines tluee encoding forms that allow the sarne data to be 
transmitted in a byte, word or double word oriented format (i.e. in 8, 16 or 32-bits per code unit). 
Where, UTF-8 is popular for HTML and becoming a dominant method for exchanging 
international text information through network. 
Ail three encoding fonns that the Unicode Standard defines can encode the same common 
character collection and can be transformed into one another efficiently without Joss of data. 
However, the advantage of compatibility also makes the UTF-8 be an exploitable security flaw. 
The following cases demonstrate how hackers initiate attacks aiming at UTF-8 flaws. 
Case Study 
Take Directory Traversai as an example, a typical input exploitation, for example. The" .. /" 
charactcr sequence is not guaranteed to conquer, especially since most security checks get along 
just fine with raw character without encoding. 
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ru_· _ç_S_C_.o_d_e~(H_e_x~) __ ,__BinaryUTF~S_F_o_r_rn_a_t~----~-------------------------4 
00-7F Oxxxxxxx 
80-7FF 11 Oxxxxx 1 Oxxxxxx 
800-FFFF 11 1 Oxxxx 1 Oxxxxxx 1 Oxxxxxx 
1 000-1 FFFFF 1111 Oxxx l Oxxxxxx 1 Oxxxxxx 1 Oxxxxxx 
Table 4-1 Legal UTF-8 Sequences 
Overlong UTF-8 
Firstly, Jet us consiçler the various representations of "."(ASCII 2E). According to the 
specification listed in the Table 4-1 , suppose we use the second UTF-8 range (2 bytes) to 
represent it, we get an overlong representation, %CO%AE. Likewise, there are more overlong 
representations with the other UTF-8 encoding: %E0%80%AE, and %F0%80%80%AE. For the 
character "/" (ASCII 2F), we can also ded uce its deformed representations: %CO%AF, 
%E0%80%AF, %F0%80%80%AF. Thus, for the character sequence " .. /", we might have 4*4*4 
= 64 different choices to present it. 
Illegal UTF -8 
We even can have more than that. Consider the representation %CO%AE of character ".". 
Just like UTF-8 encoding requires, the second octet has "1 0" as its two most significant bits. 
Now, it is possible to infer 3 variants for it, by enumerating the rest of the alternative 2 bit 
combinations ("00", "0 1" and "Il"). Since sorne UTF-8 parsers sim ply check the ]east significant 
6 bits (they ignore the most significant 2 bits), they would think these variants as identical to the 
original symbol. It shou ld be kept in mind that these character sequences are illegal, since they do 
not comply with the legitimate UTF-8 formats listed in the Table 4-1 . 
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Now, we have severa! diverse representations of one character sequence" .. /" . Suppose, one 
of the security checks searches for" .. /", and it is carried out before character filter takes place, it 
is possible to exploit the Directory Traversai flaw with the overlong UTF-8 encoding. The reason 
why the attack can be successful is that it is impossible for security check to recognize ail variant 
formats . Jt is the reason that drives us to introduce the centralized character filter. Thus, a suitable 
canonical form should be chosen and ali HTTP requests must canonicalized into that form before 
any security checks are performed. 
4.4.2 Countermeasure 
In the implementation of centralized character filter, we use following methods to handle 
system-sensitive or security-sensitive characters. 
In the Web Agent, the HTTP request after normalization is kept in the XML format, so we 
must pay attention to XML-sensitive characters. Because most character formats have an escape 
sequence to handle this case, we use the corresponding escape value to replace the sensitive 
character. As for the character encoding related to the problems, two cases have to be considered: 
• If the UTF-8 encoding is illegal, filter out these character sequences. 
• If the UTF-8 encoding is val id but overlong, a canonical UTF-8 form (2 bytes) is adopted 
as standard form. Any overlong character sequence must be converted into 2-byte-long 
format. 
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4.5 N ormalization 
After HTTP request passes through centralized character filter, the filtered and canonicat 
data is available. Before Web Agent sends the data to WebiDS, it I111JSt convert the fi ltered 
information into a specifie format for the subsequent processing. 
XML (Extensible Markup Language) is considered as a desired form of the data. The 
reasons for adopting XML can be summarized as follows: 
• Unlike HTML, XML tags identify the data itself rather than sp~çify how to display it. It's 
common to use XML as a medium for data exchange on the web. 
• J2EE platform provides various methods for processing XML, such as SAX and DOM, etc. 
Moreover, XML can be easily deployed in any J2EE-compliant environment. 
Therefore, we use SAX parser and XSLT to convert HTTP request to XML format. Figure 
4-3 il lustrates the DTD (Document Type Definition) of XML fi le after normalization. 
4.6 Conclusion 
ln this chapter, details about the design of the Web Agent are discussed . The Web Agent 
collects and nonnalizes security-related data. Then it sends the normalized data to WeblDS for 
further security analysis. It also receives instruction from WebiDS. The received instruction 
message determines the client request is a normal request or an abnormal intrusion and what 
actions (i.e. drop or pass) should be taken . 
<'?xml version=" 1.0" encoding:="UTF-8'"?> 
<!ELEMENT HttpDa:ta (A pp, Agent, Client, Header, Session, Cookie?, Request?)> 
<!ATTLIST HltpData rr CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT App (AppName, AppiP, AppPort, AppTimestamp)> 
<!ELEMENT AppName (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT ApplP (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT AppPort (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT AppTitnestamp (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT Agent (AgentName, AgentlD, ApplicationiD)> 
<!ELEMENT AgentName (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT AgentiD (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENTApplicationiD (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT Client (ClientName, ClientlP, ClientPort)> 
<!ELEMENT ClientName (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT ClientlP (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT ClientPort (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT Header (HeaderParam+)> 
<!ELEMENT HeaderParam (Name, Value)> 
<!ELEMENT Session (SessioniD, Created, LastAccessed)> 
<!ELEMENT SessionlD (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT Created (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT LastAccessed (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT Cookie (CookieParam+)> 
<!ELEMENT CookieParam (Name, Value)> 
<!ELEMENT Request (RequestParam+)> 
<!ELEMENT RequestParam (Name, Value)> 
<!ELEMENT Name (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT Value (#PCDATA)> 
Figure 4-3 DTD for HTTP Request 
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CHAPTER5 
ANAL YSIS ENGINE 
In this chapter, details about Analysis Engine are revealed. In this project, two analysis 
algorithms are employed: one is Pattern Matching, which is based on Misuse Detection 
Algorithm; the other is Behaviour Modeling, which is based on Anomaly Detection. 
5.1 Description 
Analysis Engine is the most important part of Intrusion Detection Framework for Web 
application, which implements of two algorithms: Pattern Matching Engine and Behavior 
Modeling Engine. Sorne considerations have to be taken into account when design Analysis 
Engine, and they can be summarized as follows: 
• Initialization of analysis-related data, which contains configuration files. 
• Pattern Matching Engine and Behaviour Modeling Engine perfonn intrusion analysis on 
the data captured by Web Agent. 
• Trigger Response Module to carry out specifie action once the analysis result is concluded. 
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5.2 Pattern Matching Engine 
Pattern Matching Engine makes use of an extension of Misuse Detection technique [22], 
Pattern Matching algorithm. lt attempts to encode knowledge about well-known attacks as 
patterns and monitors for the occurrence by matching the captured data with pre-defined patterns . 
If current HTTP request contains any intrusion pattern, an intrusion is identified . 
Design of Pattern Matching Engine 
• Three configuration files in the XML format, including rule-mapping file, rule definition 
files and attack target file must be initialized before pattern-matching analysis starts. 
• According to the declarations in the target file, classify HTTP request sent from Web 
Agent into severa) patis. 
• With the combination of rule~mapping file, rule definition files and target file, 
pattern-matching analysis can be executed in a loop. 
• Whenever an analysis result is concluded, pattern Matching Engine triggers Response 
Module to execute actions. 
• The loop of rule matching must be terminated if an intrusion is detected or the current 
HTTP request completes the pattern-matching analysis. 
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5.2.1 File Description 
Parameters of pattern-matching analysis have to be initialized in advance, before intrusion 
detection stat1s. Three configuration files are defined in the Pattern Matching Engine; they are 
ru le definition files, rule-mapping file and target file, respectively. The data in these three files 
has to be read and mapped to corresponding Java abjects, !iO future pattern-matching analysis can 
retrieve these required data easily and conveniently from system memory. 
Rule Files 
There are two types of rules defined in the Pattern Matching Engine. Where, system-rule 
file specifies the patterns extracted from well-known attacks; and user-rule file keeps custom 
rules that a Web application administrator has to declare. Table 5-1 illustrates the structure of a 
rule. 
Item Name Description 
ID Rule ID 
RuieN ame Name of a rule 
Version Version information of a rule 
làrget The HTTP request that a rule matches against 
Pattern Pre-defined pattern extracted from well-known attacks 
-~ 
CaseSensitive A rule is case-sensitive or not 
-- -
-
Length Leng;h of parameter defined in the Target item 
Reference No Reference information of a rule 
Table 5-1 Structure of a Rule 
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Rule-Mapping File 
A configuration file, rule-mapping filç is ddined in the Pattern Matching Engine. The 
primary function of thi s file is to build rnapping relationship among application, agent, rule and 
related action data. 
Since Web Agent might associate with more than one Web applications, the mapping 
relationship among them must be clearly stated. For a particular combination of Web application 
and Web Agent, response actions to take should be determined. Therefore, rule-mapping file is a 
map to demonstrate relationsh ips among rules, actions, Web applications and Web Agents. The 
fo llowing table exp lains the structure of a ru le mapping. 
Item Namc Description 
ApplicationlD ID of Application 
AgentiD ID of Web Agent 
--
Rule ID ID of Rule 
na me Two choices for this attribute offanvard element: 
match : J-ITTP·request ftts the ru le determined by Rule!D 
forward 
umnatch: HTTP request does not fit the ru le determined by 
Rule!D 
actionJD ID of action to be executed 
uctionParam The customized action parameter 
Table 5-2 Structure of a Rule Mapping 
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Target File 
The information defined in the target file represents the patt of the HTTP reqt!est data that 
may be used by attacker to deliv~r mal icious content. The tenu "target" is used to represent 
various sections of HTTP protocol. Six "targets" are defined in the "target" file; they are Header, 
URI (Unifonn Resource Identifier), Session, Cookie, Post parameten; and Get parameters, 
respectively. The "target" defined in the rule files must be one of the six "targets". Thus, each 
incoming HTTP request must be broken into these six pé~-tts detïned in the target file . The 
structure of a target and can be illustrated by the following table. 
Item Namc Description 
TargetName Name ofTarget 
Targetltem A target might contain severa! distinct items, i.e. HTTP Heacler. 
So this field lists possible target items that a target includes. 
Table 5-3 Structure of a Target 
The Relationship of Three Files 
Figure 5-4 illustrates the relationship of the three files, rule definition file, target file and 
rule-mapping file. 
• A Rule!D is specified in the file, rule-mapping. 
• According to the reference to Rule!D, the specifie rule can be retrieved from the rule 
definition fil e. 
1-
• Integrate the pattern (regular expression), case-sensitive and length argurnents tqg~ther, an 
attack pattern is generated. 
• The combination of "target" reference in the rule definition file and target definition in the 
target file determine wbich section ofl-ITTP protocol must be examined. 
• The corr~sponding action data are retrieved from the nile-mapping file, once the analysis 
result is concluded. 
forward 
L·----·-
Rule-Mapping File 
Action-list to 
Response Module 
CaseSensitive -t------t 
Length 
Reference No 
Rule Definition File 
r 
-~--~ 
,, 
TargetName Relevant HTTP Request 
L Targetitem -- Do Matching ~ 
Target Fil e 
Figure 5-1 Relationship of Tables in Pattern Matching Engine 
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5.2.2 How to Perform Rule Matching 
Basic Algorithm 
Rule matching is the most critical part in the Pattern Matching Engine. For each specifie 
Web application and Web Agent, severa) different RuleMappings might be defined . The 
RuleMapping traversai involves following steps: 
1. If there are un-visited RuleMappings left or special flag (i.e. deny-jlag, pass-jlag) is not set, 
the loop continues; otherwise it terminates. 
2. Retrieve current RuleMapping from rule-mapping file, and the rule to be used can be 
determined based on the conditions defined in the rule. 
3. Once the rule is selected, "target' of the HTTP request data is determined through the target 
element declared in the rule definition file and reference to the target file. 
4. According to the "target" specified in the step 3, retrieve the corresponding HTTP section 
from the HTTP request received from Web '1-gent. 
5. Match the rule against the part of HTTP request retrieved in the Jast step and conclude 
rule-matching result. 
6. Action data is determined based on the matching result and the action declaration in the 
RuleMapping. 
7. In tenns of the action data concluded in the last step, special flag (i.e. deny-jlag, pass1lag) 
might be set. 
8. Deliver the action data and matching result to Response Module to invoke action. 
9. Go to step 1 again until the loop terminates or special flag is set. 
The following programming fragment illustrates how this works. In tines 4-5, if a special 
flag is set true, terminates the rule-mapping loop. Current rule mapping is specified in the !ines 
8-9. Li nes 10-11 select a rule used as attack pattern. Li ne 13 ca Ils a priva te method, 
dispatchTarget, to perform pattern matching for each specifie "target". 
Lines 17-36 show how the private method, dispatchTarget, works for GET parameter in 
HTTP request. The detailed GET parameter data is prepa.red in tine 22. Lines 25-27, rule 
matching between the specifie rule and GET parameter is done, the corresponding analysis result 
and error comment (it is an empty string, if no intrusion is found) are concluded . Lines 29-30, the 
action data can be determined through the combination of rule mapping and matching result. 
Based on the action data, special flag(s) might be set in the line 31. The Response Module is 
triggered to carry out response actions in line 32. 
50 
51 
1. whilc (mleMappingContinued) // lf ruleMapping continues 
2. { 
3. 
4. if (passFiag Il denyflag llredirectFlag) //If passFlag, denyFlag, or redircctFiag is set 
5. break; 
6. 
7. Il Get current RuleMapping for Pa,ttern Matching 
8. ruleMapping = 
9. currentRuleMapping.getCurrentRuleMapping(ruleContigData, ruleMappingCount); 
10. String ru leiD = ruleMapping.getRuleiD(); //(jet cur.rent Rule!D fbr Pattern Matching 
11. rule= currentRulc.getCurrentRule(ruleData, ruleiD); // Current Rule for Pattern Matching 
12. // Invoke various RuleMatcher to do Pattem Matching in terms of different target 
13. this.dispatchTarget(rule.getTarget(), rule, actionData); 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. private void dispatchTarget(String target, RuleObject rule, ActionSet action Data) 
18. { 
19. 
20. case REQGET: Il Target is ReqGet 
21. { 
22. Vector reqGet = currentTarget.getReqGet(); 
23. if(reqGet !""' null) 
24. 
25 . 
26. 
27 . 
28. 
{ 
reqGetMatcher.doMatching(reqGet, rule, resultCache); // Do Pattern Matching 
boo lean matchingResult "" reqGetM~ttcher.getMatchii1gResult(); 
String errorComment "' reqGetMatcher.getErrorComment(); 
29. forwardA ct ion Vector=forwardAction .ge tF orwardA ction Vector(match ingResult, 
30. ruleMapping); // Get forward Actions and execut~ 
31 . setFlag(forwardActionVector); 
32. actionManager.executeAction( errorComrnent,forwardAction Vector,actionData); • 
33 . } 
34. } 
35. 
36. } 
Figure 5-2 Programming Details on Rule Matching 
Special Flags 
In this Pattern Matching Engine, four special flags, including deny-flag, pass-:flag, 
redirect-flag and skip-flag, are used to represent the current status of the processing. If one of the 
four flags is set, the corresponding action will be executed. The detailed explanations can be 
summarized as follows: 
Deny-flag: when this flag is set, it means that an intrusio11 i;; detected. Thus, the incoming 
HTTP request should be denied. 
• Pass-flag: when this flag is true, it indicates that current HTTP request does not trigger any 
rule in the pattern-matching analysis. 
Redirect-flag: when this flag is true, it implies an error is found . However, client will 
receive a redirected web page or an error page. 
Skip-flag: when this flag is true, it means a list of ru les could be skipped over or ignored 
without further analysis. 
In the Response Module, four response actions corresponding to the four flags are defined. 
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They arc de.ny-action, pass-action, redirect-action and skip-action, respectively. Once an action is 
triggered, the corresponding flag is set. More information about the response action is discussed 
in the Chapter 6 Response Module. 
53 
5.3 Behavior Modeling Engine 
5.3.1 Behavior Modeling AJgorithm 
The algoritbm of Behaviour Modeling is based on anomaly-based detection [2] , which is 
complementary to the misuse detection. [n this case, detection is based on models of normal 
behaviour of users and applications, called "profiles". Any deviations from such established 
profiles are interpreted as attacks or intrusions. The main advantage of Behaviour Modeling 
algorithm is that it is able to identify previously unknown attacks. By defining an expected 
normal state, any abnormal behaviour can be detected, once it cannat fit into the normal 
behaviour profile. 
The Behaviour Modeling algorithm follows a Jearning-based anomaly detection technique. 
An example of this technique is described by FOtTest [24] . Dt1ring the training phase, the system 
collects ali distinct system cali sequences of a certain specified Iength. During detection, ali 
actual system cali sequences are compared to the set of legitimate ones concludcd in the training 
period, raising an alarm if no match is fou nd. 
Therefore, the algorithm works in two modes, Jearning mode and detection mode. It can be 
illustrated by the following figure. 
• ).,earning mod~: during learning period, mod~ls (or profiles) that characterizc the normal 
behaviour of the Web application are built based on the network events observed. 
Detection 111ode: when Behaviour Modeling Engine works in the detection mode, ali 
incoming requests are compared to the profiles that were established in the learning mode. 
If an intrusion (the request is deviated from the normal proflle) is detected, a related alert 
can be rai sed. 
r·----------- -~1\ 
( Behavior ( \ 
1 Mode! ing ) 
\ Database ; 
\ \_ __ -----v----CY 
(Detection-mode) Behavior Analysis (Leaming-mode) Build Profiles 
_.--- ------.\ ~~ Behavior Modeling 
Abnormal Behavior 14 ----~~ } Analysis Engine 
"''-- / D~:i~t~~n L ___________ __, ldentify Nonnal 
Figure 5-3 Behavior Modeling Algorithm 
The Behaviour Modeling algorithm conforms to the statistical approach of anomaly 
detection. In the learning moçie, behaviour profiles for subjects (i.e. , Request panuneter and URI) 
are generated. A user defina.ble threshold is used to evaluate if the current behaviour could be 
stored to database as a legitimate profile. After the le<,trning phase, the system switches to 
detection mode in wh ich the new traffic is compared to the profile for detection of anomalies. 
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1-Iowever, sinçe a system can evolve over time, it is also likely that new non~malicious 
inputs will be seen [3] [25]. In the other word, the false positive rate will increase dramatically 
after a long time running. Jt is simple to update rhe profile-base by the learning phase on the 
changed traffic when the number of fa! se positive alarms is greater than the pre-defined value. 
In the Behaviour Modeling Engine, tv,ro Behaviour Modeling algorithms are extended to 
detect security-related issues in the request URI, and request parameter. We will discuss these 
two algorithms in the Section 5.3.4 and Section 5.3.5, respectively. 
Design of Behavior Modeling Engine 
• Like Pattern Matching Engine, Behavior Modeling Engine also bas to initialize the 
configuration files before analysis statts. These XML configuration files include 
model-mapping file and the mode! definition file . 
• Behavior Modeling Engine determines its working modes based on the configuration 
provided by model-mapping file and mode! definition file. 
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• Suppose Behavior Modeling Engine is in learning mode, characterize normal behaviors of 
events and establish profile. 
• If Behavior Modeling Engine is in detection mode, match the incoming requests with 
legitimate profile. Whenever an analysis result is concluded, Behavior Modeling Engine 
tires Response Module to execute the corresponding actions. 
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5.3.2 File Description 
Like Pattern Matching Engine, in itialization should be done before behaviour~modeling 
analysis starts. Two files are defined here, and they are the mode! definition file, and 
model~mapping file. 
Model File 
In the Behaviour Modeling Engine, two modeling algorithms are developed to check 
request parameter and request URI in the HTTP request. The two modeling algorithms 
correspond to two "Mode!" elements declared in the mode! definition file. Thus, when we build 
mode! for request parameter or request URI, the corresponding part of HTTP request will be 
evaluated according to the definitions in the madel definition file. The file structure is illustrated 
by the following table: 
Item Name Description 
ModeiiD ID ofmodel 
ModelName Name of Mode! 
Threshold An integer value that determines if the activity should be classiflecl us a 
normal behavior. When the number of times that a behavior occurs is 
greater than the defined threshold, we would trcat it as normal behavior. 
Cum~ntMoçle Working state of current nwdel; it oould be lcarning Ot' detection mode. 
Table 5-4 Structure of a Model 
-- ---- -- ------- - - --- -- - - --- -------
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Model-Mapping File 
Just like the rule-mapping file employed in the P<.~ttcrn Matching Engine, a model"mapping 
file is defined in the Behavior Modeling Engine. The primary function of this file i.s to build 
mapping among application, agent, mode! anc! related actions. In the other ward, the 
model-mapping file is a map to demonstrate relationships among models, actions, Web 
applications and Web Agents. 
Item Name Description 
ApplicationiD ID of Application 
AgentiD lD of Web Agent 
ModeliD ID ofModel 
.-
na me Two choices fQr this attribute ofjorwarcl element: 
match: HTTP request flts the profile determined by ModellD 
forward 
unmatch; HTTP request does not fit the profile determined by 
MoclellD 
actionlD ID of action to be executed. 
•. 
actionParam The customized action paramet(il r 
Table 5-5 Structure of a Modei-Mapping 
The Relationships of Two Files 
The following figure illustrates the relationships of the two configuration files , mode! file 
and model-mapping file. 
• A Moclel!D is specified in the model-mapping file. 
• Basecl on the reference to Moclel!D, the detailed mode] data can be retrieved from the 
mode] definition fi le. 
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The Mode!Name dec lared in the mode! definition fi le determines which p~ui of HTTP 
information must be examined. 
• The CurrentMode specified in the mode! definition file determines th~ current running 
mode of the mode!, learning or detection . 
If " learn ing mode" is signed, the threshold declared in the mode! definition file provides a 
lower boundary ofthe number of times a norma l behaviour occurs. 
If "detection mode" is configured, the corresponding action data cou ld be retrieved from 
the mode l-mapping file once the analysis result is concluded . 
Relevant 
ApplicationlD 
--------
.....,. Model!D HTTP Request 
AgentiD Mode!Name 
ModeliD ...- Threshold 
forward CurrentMode Yalid 
occurrence 
times 
ModelConfig.xml Model.xml 
Action-list to Learning or Establish Profil e 
Response Moduel Detection mode 
r r , 
Figure 5-4 Relationship of Tables in Behavior Modeling Engine 
59 
5.3.3 How to Perform Bebavior Modeling 
Basic Algorithm 
For each specifie Web application and Web Agent, severa! different Mode/Mappings might 
be processed. The Mode!Mapping traversai involves following stcps: 
1. If there is un-visited Mode/Mapping left or special flag (i.e. deny-jlag, pass-jlag) is not set, 
the loop continues; otherwise it terminates . 
2. Retrieve current Mode!Mapping from model-mapping file, and the mode! to be used ean be 
detennined subsequently. 
3. Once the mode! is specified, mode! narne is used to refer to the actual mode! data defined 
in mode! definition file. 
4. According to the mode! name specified in the step 3, the cletailed HTTP section could be 
retrieved from the HTTP request forwarded by Web Agent. 
5. The corresponding working mode can be determined once a specifie mode! is concluded in 
the step 3. 
If the model is in learning mode: 
6. If it is in learning mode, invoke learning procedure, establish profile, and go to step 1. 
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If the model is in detection mode: 
6. If it is in detection mode, invoke detection procedure and conclude analys is result. 
7. Action data can be determined through the combination of matching rcsult and 
Mode!Mapping. 
8. Accorcling to the action data deduced in the last step, special flag (i.e. deny jlag, pass jlag) 
mi ght be set. 
9. Deliver the action data and matching result to Response Module to invoke action. 
1 O. Go to step 1 again until the loop terminates or a special flag is set. 
Special Flags 
The special flags, including deny-flag, pass-fl ag, and redirect-fl ag, are used in the 
Behaviour Modeling Engine again. If one of the three flags is set, the corresponding action will 
be executed. The definitions of the th ree special fl ags are same as th ose in the Pattern Matching 
Engine. The three response actions corresponding to the special flags are discussed in the Chapter 
6 Response Module. 
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5.3.4 URI Modeling Algorithm 
The algorithm is designed to verify any abnormal behaviour 111 the request URI. 
Exploitations, like Directory Traversai, and other invalid URI requests . 
Data Structure 
Two issues have to be considered when designing data structure used in the learning mode. 
First, the class for URI modeling defines a "counter" field to count how many times the UIU is 
requested. Thus, a URI address attribute and an attribute for counter are defined in the class. 
Second, ali URis should compose of a URI collection. So, an instance variable of List is 
constructed to store the ail request URI objects. The following figure shows the declaration of a 
request URI object, URIStatistic . 
URIStatistic 
-uri: String 
-counter: Integer 
+getCounter(): Integer 
+getUri(): String 
+plusCounter(): void 
+setCounter( counter: Integer): void 
+setUri( uriVv'ithQuery: String) : void 
+toString(): String 
Figure 5-5 Data Structure of Class URIStatistic 
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Algorithm 
• Lcarning mode: During the learning period, ali distinct URis in the Web application could 
be learned. For each request URI, we record how many times the URI is requested . When 
the number is greater than the threshold defined in the moçlel definition file, the URI could 
be stored in database as a URI profile. 
• Detection mode: In the detection mode, it matches current request URI with the valid URI 
profile and returns analysis result. 
5.3.5 Parameter Modeling Algorithm 
The modeling algorithm is used to detect deviation of request parameters, including POST 
parameters and GET parameters. It can help Web application to prevent from attacks or 
intrusions related to request parameters, such as SQL Injection or XSS (Cross-Site Scripting), 
etc. 
Data Structure 
We pre-define data types ofHTTP request parameter in the database. So, we can determine 
the type of a request parameter by matching the request parameter with pre-defined parameter 
type during learning period. Since there are severa! alternative parameter types for a single 
parameter, we can design more than one counter to record how many times that a parameter is of 
a specifie type. 
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ln the other word, a request parameter might associate with severa) çounters, and each 
collnter corresponds to a possible parameter type. Thus, we declare two attributes !11 the 
ParamStatistic class; one is parameter name, the other is a list of counters. 
Each counter shotJid also be a compound data, or an abject. It is composed oftwo attributes; 
one attribute is to mark the identity of possible parameter type, the other is just an integer counter. 
The following figure shows the data structure of ParamStatistic and ParamTypeCounter, where 
ParamT;peCounter is an inner class of class ParamStatistic . 
Moreover, in order to build profiles for ali request parameters in the learning mode, the 
parameters should compose of a paramvter collection. So, an instance variable of List is 
constructed to store the ali request parameter abjects. 
PararnStatistic 
-paramName: String 
-par am Typelist: List 
+addParamType(typeName: String): void 
+çc•ntain$Par ëlm Type(typeNarne: String): Boolean 
+getCounter(typeName: String): Integer 
+getParamName(): String 
+plusCounter(typeNarne: String): void 
HetPëlramName(paramName: String) : void 
+tostring() : string 
ParamTypeCounter· 
-paramType: String 
-counter: Integer 
+getCounter() : Integer 
+getPëlrarnType(): String 
+plusCounter() : void 
+setParamType(paramType: String): void 
+toStrin(J(): String 
Figure 5-6 Data Structure of Class ParamStatistic 
Algoritlun 
Learning Mode 
In the learning mode of pararneter mode ling, ali parameters of the Web application have to 
be profiled. We have ali possible parameter types stored in a table in the database. And 
these parameter types are described with Regular Expression. For each request parameter, 
we record how many times this parameter matches to a specifie parameter type. When the 
number exceeds the pre-defined threshold declared in the mode! definition file, the 
parameter name and data type are inserted into database as a legitimate profile. 
Detection Mode 
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During detection period, it wi 11 verify if the current request parameter matches to legitimate 
parameter profile derived in the learning mode, and returns the analysis result. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Analysis Engine module is the most important part in the Intrusion Detection framework 
for Web application. The responsibility of Analysis Engine is to receive captured HTTP request 
from Web Agent and detect if there is any intTusion or malicious exploitation in the request. 
Then, Analysis Engine triggers Response Mod~IIe to carry out specifie actions based on the 
analysis result. In this chapter, detection algorithms including Pattern Matching based on Misuse 
algoritbm and Behaviour Modeling based on Anomaly-based detection are discussed. 
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CHAPTER6 
RESPONSE MODULE 
The focus of this chapter is to reveal the implementation details associated with Response 
Module. Firstly, we introduce a config4ration file. lt is used to define actions deployed in the 
Response Module. Then, implementation ofResponse Module is discussed. 
6.1 Description 
According to analysis result and pre-deflned actions, Responsc Module takes corresponding 
actions. Moreover, it sends action instruction to Web Agent. 
If an intrusion is detected, "deny' ' action must be triggered, an alert has to be sent to 
administrator of the Web application. Additionally, maliciousHTTP request data will be insetted into 
da.tabase. As a result, Web Agent will reçeive an analysis result aqion instruction, and the malicious 
attacker will get an error page or request-forbidden page. 
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If no intn1sion ~xists, Response Module will inform the web Agent thaJ the current request 
is legitimate, and the client will get his or her requested page. 
Design of Response Module 
• The configuration file, action definition file, must be initialized in advance before 
Response Module is triggered. 
• Based on the analysis result and action data sent from Analysis Engine, Response Module 
executes corresponding actions. 
• Returns action instruction(s) to Web Agent. Then, Web Agent can respond different pages 
to clients. 
6.2 File Initialization 
Action definition file is the configuration file for Response Module to dec lare the actions 
that will be executed. The actions will be fired once the analysis result of signature detection or 
anomaly detection is concluded. Table 6-1 shows the structure of an action. 
Item Name Dcscl'iption 
--
ActionlD ID of action 
ActionCom Command for this action 
ActionComParam Sorne parameters related with this action . Take skip action for 
example, a list of rules can be defined here which indicate the 
giv~n rules can be skipped over during further Pattern Matching 
Analysis. 
Table 6-1 Structure of an Action 
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Actions in Response Module 
There are seven unique actions defined i~1 the Response Module, they are de11y action, pass 
' 
action, continue action, skip action, redirect action, exec action, and logcantent action. The 
detailed explanations ofthese actions are as follows: 
• Deny action: 
When this action is triggered, it indicates that an intrusion is detected and the current HTTP 
request should be denied. Customized message can be defined in the a_ctionComParam to 
describe the reason that HTTP request is denied. Even if there is other ru les or models left 
or un-visited in the analysis loop, the CUITent analysis terminates immediately. 
• Pass action: 
If current incoming HTTP request passes the analysis of pattern matching or behavior 
modeling, this action will be performed. When this action is fired, curre.nt analysis 
terminates even ifthere are other rules or models left or un-visited in the analysis loop. 
• Continue action: 
Unlike Pass action, when Continue action is fired, next rule or mode! in sequence will be 
executed continually instead of ignoring them. 
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• Skip action: 
When this action is triggered, a number of rules that specified in the actionComParam 
element will be ignored. 
• Redirect action: 
If an intrusion or attack is detected, Redirect action could be alternative choice. This 
redirected page is the customized web page specified by administrator. A redirected URL 
cou ld be specified in the actionComParam element. 
• Exec action: 
Administrator can declare sorne externat commands in the actionComParam element of 
this action. For example, send an ale1t or alarm to administrator by email when an intrusion 
is confirmed. 
• Logcontent action: 
When an intrusion is detected, intrusion log should be generated. Thus, the job of this 
action is to produce log. The open source software Log4j is deployed to manage the 
logging conveniently. 
----- - - - - ------ -- - ---- - -
- - ---·--------------------
6~3 Impletnentation of Response Module 
6.3.1 Execution of Response Acti()n 
According to the definitions ln the model-mapping or rule-mapping file, the action data 
delivered from Analysis Engine includes actionil) and actionComParam. With the combination 
of the received action data and action definition file, Response Module executes specified 
action(s). The equivalent pseudo code is stated below. 
Pseudo Code 
1. Argument forwardedActions indicates the action data sent from Analysis Engine. Only 
action!D and actionComParam are included in it. 
2. Argument analysisResult represents the matching result set by the Analysis Engine. It 
includes intrusion description or error message. 
3. We use 4CtioniD[forwardAction] and actionPwamfforwardAction] to hold action!D and 
action command parameter of a response action, respectively. 
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4. We use action!D[action] and actionCom[action] to hold action!D and action command of 
a pre-defined actiondeclared in the action definition file. 
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The algorithm ResponseModule works as follows. The for loop of li nes 1-7 execute each 
action detennined by action!D. Lines 2-3 get actionlD and action parameter of current action to 
be fired . Line 4 calls procedure ResponseModule-Get-ActionCom to retrieve action command 
corresponding to the given action!D. Lines 5-6 handle the case in which the ret1,11'!1Cd action 
comment is valid. Line 6 carries the determined action into execution. Line 7 prints an error 
message when action command is nul!. 
ResponseModule (forwardedActlons, analysisResult) 
1. for each forwardAction in the forwardActions 
2. 
currentActionlD .-- actioniD[forwardAction] 
3. 
currentActionComParam ,__ actionParam[forwardAction] 
4. 
currentActionCom +- ResponseModule-Get-ActionCom (currentActionlD) 
5. 
if currentActionCom =t NIL 
6. execute action specified by currentActionCom with given currentActionComParam 
7. else error "Inval id ActionJD" 
8. return 
ResponseModule-Get-ActionCom ( currentActionJD) 
1. 
actions ~- Actions declared in the action definition file 
2. 
- ······-·-.._A _ .... ! ___ n__ ___ li.Tlf 
Figure 6-1 Pseudo Code for Response Module 
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6.3.2 Send Action Instruction to \Veb Agent 
An action instruction should be returned to Web Agent, no matter whether an intrusion is 
detected in the HTTP request or not. With the result from Analysis Engine, Web Agent can 
retu.rn diff~rent web pages to client. If an intrusion is recognized, a client might receive an ~rror 
page or redirected page; otherwise, he or she would get requested page. 
A class named ResponseActionSen 1let that extends HttpServlet IS developed to send 
response message from WebiDS to Web Agent. 
• When an intrusion is detected, the malicious HTTP request must be inserted into database 
for further analysis or kept as intrusion evidences. And a short error description will be 
returned to Web Agent. 
• Jf no intrusion is detected, "OK" respond shoulcl be sent to Web Agent. 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the implementation ofResponse Module is discussed. The primaty funetion 
of this component is to execute response actions according to matching result and action data 
from the Analysis Engine. Moreover, the process for making response to Web Agent is also 
discussed . 
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CHAPTER 7 
DATABASE 
In chapter 7, WebiDS database design is reviewed. Tables used to store malicious HTTP 
requl!st and tables used in the Behavior Modeling Engine to keep established profiles are 
reviewed. Finally, we discuss on the data access technology in WebiDS supported by 
Spring-framework and Hibernate briefly. Two databases are created in this proj~ct. One is for the 
storage of malicious HTTP requests, and the other is to store the configuration for 
behavior-modeling analysis. 
7.1 Database for HTTP Request 
lf an intrusion or attack is d~tected, the malicious HTTP request must be saved to database 
for futther analysis. Therefore, a database named Http!nfoDB is created to hold those data. Since 
the HTTP requests sent from Web Agent are broken down into seven pa1ts, and seven tables are 
created for them correspondingly. 
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They are W~b application. table, Web Agent table, client table, HTTP headcr table, session 
table, çookie table, ançl request parameter table. The tables are designed as followings; 
• Application Table: 
Field Name Description 
ID ID of application information (Prirnary Key) 
ClientiD ID of client (Foreign Key) 
AppName Name of Web application 
ApplP IP address of Web application 
AppP01t Port of Web application 
Table 7-1 Structure of Malicious HTTP Request: Application 
• Agent Table: 
Field Name Description 
lD ID of Web Agent record (Primary Key) 
ClientiD ID of client (Foreign Key) 
AgentName Name of Web Agent 
Table 7-2 Structure of Malicious HTTP Request: Agent 
• Client Table: 
Field Name Description 
ID ID of client record (Primary Key) 
ClientName Name of client machine 
ClientlP IP address of client machine 
ClientPort Port of client machine 
Table 7-3 Structure of Malicious HTTP Request: Client 
---------------- --- -------------------------------------
/4 
• HTTP Header Table: 
Field Namc Description 
ID ID ofheader record (PI'imary Key) 
ClientiD ID of client (Foreign Key) 
HeaderName Name ofHTTP header item 
HeaderValue Value of HTTP header item 
Ta ble 7-4 Structure of Malicious HTTP Request: Header 
• Session Table: 
}.,ield Name Descriptio11 
ID ID of session record (Primary Key) 
ClientrD ID of client (Fol'eign Key) 
SessioniD Identifier that the servlet container assigns to the session 
SessionCreated The time when the session is created 
SessionLastAccess ed The last time that a client sends a request associatcd with the session 
Ta ble 7-5 Structure of Malicious HTTP Request: Session 
• Cookie Table: 
Field Name Description 
ID ID of cookie record (Primary Key) 
ClicntlD ID of client (Foreign Key) 
CookieKey Name ofthe cookie 
CookieValue Value of cookie 
Ta ble 7-6 Structure of Malicious HTTP Request: Cookie 
• Request Param eter Table: 
Field Name Description 
ID ID of parameter record (Primary Key) 
ClientlD ID of client (Foreign Key) 
Method Method of HTTP request, GET or POST 
ParamKey Name of request parameter 
Param Value Value ofrequest parameter 
Tab le 7-7 Structure of Malicious HTTP Request: Parameter 
- - - ·--------------
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7.2 Databasc for Behavior Modeling Engine 
A database named BehaviorModelingDB is clesigned to facilitate the Behavior Modeling 
analysis. There are static tables as weil as dynamic tables used in th~ Behavior Modeling Engine. 
Static table is created before behavior-modeling analysis begins. Dynamic table stores the 
profiles established during learning phase. 
The Static Table 
In the parameter mocleling, a static table stores pre-clefined parameter in the database. The 
structure of table ParamTypelnfo, can be illustrated as follow: 
Field Name Desçriptiou 
ID ID of parameter type (Primary Key) 
1_T-'):,...:'P'-e_N_a_m_e~------+-N~a.rne of the parat.~n_et_e_r -=ty-"-p_e ________ ~~----~ 
ParamType Parameter type pattet·n describcd with Regular Exp1·ession. During 
learning period, it might be retrieved to match against each 
~-------~~----~-re_q~u_e_stparan~1e_~t_e_r. ____________________________ ~ 
Table 7-8 Structure of ParamTypelnfo 
The Dynamic Table 
The dynamic tables keep web application profiles generated during learning mode of 
behavior-modeling analysis. There are two dynamic tables ParamProfile and URJProfile in the 
BehaviorModelingDB. They can be illustrated by the following figures, respectively: 
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ParamProfï le Table: 
Field Name Description 
_,....,.._, 
ID ID of parameter profile record (Primary Key) 
~ ~ 
ParamName Parameter name 
.~ 
TxpeiD ID of parameter type (Foreign Key). It d~termines panuneter type 
of a giv~n parameter concluded in the learning phase. 
Table 7-9 Structure of ParamProfile 
URl Profi le Table: 
r--· 
Field Name Description 
1-----· 
ID ID ofURI profile record (Primary Key) 
URI The URl profile value. Any deviated URI can be specl fied in 
comparison with this URI dur ing detection period . 
Table 7-10 Structure of URIProfile 
7.3 Data Access Supported by Spring and Hibernate 
The hierarchy of data access under the support of Spring and Hibernate inclucles Logic 
Representation Layer, Business Serv ice Layer, and Persistent Object Layer. 
• Persistent Object Layer: 
Persistence Layer is under the management of Hiberna,te [8], where some persistent classes 
are created. The XML files required for the object/relational mapping are declared herc too . 
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• Business Service Layer: 
Spring [23] manages Business Layer, Spring's lightweight bean container offers loC-style 
(Inversion of Control) wiring t.lp of business abjects, DAOs, and resource like JDBC 
DataSources and Hibernate SessionFactories. The following figure shows the definition 
Business Service Layer for database, BehaviorModelingDB. 
• Logical Presentation Layer: 
Logical Presentation Layer makes use of business service provided by the Business Layer 
to implement logical consideration when database-related operations are requested. For 
example, when we intend to insert legitimate parameter profile or URI profi le in the 
learning mode of the Behaviour Modeling, we just create a new persistent abject and 
request insettion service provided by the Business Layer. 
Beh~v~rModeUngDao 
HibernateDaoSupport +getParamProfiles(): List BehaviorModelingService 
+getURIProfiles(): List 
+imertProfile(profile: Object): void 
«extonds>~ _v ~ <\ ' ' '• ,• < <realize > > ' ' <<realize>> / ' ' 
' ' 
BehaviorModelingl)aoimpl BehaviorModeling5ervicelmpl 
+getParamProfiles(): List -behaviorfl'lodelingDao: BehaviorModelingDao 
+getURIProfiles(): List +getDao(): SehaviorfvlodelingDao 
+insertProfile(profile: Object): void. +getParamProfiles() : List 
+getURIProfiles(): List 
+insertProfile(profile: Object): void 
+setDao( dao: BehaviorMadelingDao): void 
Figure 7-1 Business Service Layer of BehaviorModelingDB 
------------------------- ---- -----------------~---~- ---------~ 
7.4 Conclusion 
The primary function of databa.se is to provide persist~nt storagc for the entire Intrusion 
Detection System framework In this chapter, databases and tabl~s are discussed, including tables 
for malicious HTI'P request and tables used to keep profiles in the Behaviour Modeling Engine. 
The data access under the support of Spring-framework and Hibernate makes database-rela.ted 
operations more straightforward. 
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CHAPTER8 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND CASE STUDIES 
In this chapter, functionality testing on the Web Application intrusion detection framework 
is discussed. Some common intrusion test cases are performed, including SQL Injection, 
Cross-site scripting, Directory Traversai and Hidden Field. These simulations are used to 
demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed framework. 
The simulation is done on a workstation with 2.4GHZ CPU and 512MB DDR running 
Windows() 2000 Server under Iight Joad. The web server is Tomcat 5.5 .2 [28]. The proposed 
WeblDS is executed in the same time along with the simulating HTTP requests. 
8.1 Case Studies 
We tested this framework with severa( attacking test cases. The intrusion detection 
framework can e:ffectively detect the attacks and raise alarms when exploitations occur. 
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8.1.1 SQL Injection 
Description 
According to the Top Ten Most Critical Web Application Security VulnerabiHties [29) 
issued by OW ASP [16] (Open Web Application Security Project), Injection Flaws is the 6111 of 
the top ten most critical vulnerabi lities. 
SQL Injection is one ki nd of widespread and dangerous Injection Flaws. To exploit a SQL 
Injection flaw, the attacker must find a parameter that the web application uses to dynamically 
construct a SQL guery. "By care{ul!y embedding malicious SQL commandy into the content of 
. . 
the parame ter, thot attacker can trick the Web application into (orwardinz a malicious que1y t o 
the database ~ 
Simulation 
Web Agent captures HTTP request, and nonnalizes them into XML format. The following 
fi gl!re illustrates the collected malicious parameter to exploit SQL Injection flaw: 
<Rcqucst> 
<RequestParam> 
<Name>account number</Name> 
<Value>' or ' 1= 1</Value> 
</RequestParam> 
</Request> 
Figure 8-1 Request Parameter for SQL Injection 
--------------
Pattern-matching anulysis can util ize pattern to detect SQL Injection intrusion. The rule is 
illustrated with Figure 8-2: 
<SysRulc> 
<1 D>Rule032</TD> 
<RuleName>SQLlnjection(l = l )</RuieN ame> 
·<Version> 1.0</Version> 
<Target>RcqPost</Target> 
<Patiern>[0-9] { l ,} \W {0,}=\W {0,}[0-9]{1,}</!Jat.tern> 
<CascScnsi tivc>y</CaseSensitive> 
<Lungtb> 128</Lcnglh> 
<Rcfcn.:nccNo>no</RcfcrcnccNo> 
</SysRulc> 
Figure 8-2 Rule for SQL Injection 
The intrusion log demonstrati ng the occurrence of SQL Injection Exploitation, looks like: 
8 1 
2005-03- 17 20:42:20,250- Alert: ClientiP: l27 .0.0. 1 Clien!Port: 1334 Intrusion Attempt detectcd: SQLlujeclion 
Figure 8-3 Intrusion Log for SQL Injection 
The attacker or a malicious client might get fo llowing error page: 
ti'Im St<~O.Js report 
RlXl.U2St WIIS Om'èd, b~&;Sè of !.he rO:kl'l!i'-! Q rùâ!len: 
' 1'!. (j! ~kS Ru~;! : SQUnjetl.brï(RéqPOSl] 
R.~ue;; t wag Œm:cl, be>2.f,Use of the fo'kmng re;:'ISCn : 
Jt br<:.oiŒ R.ule: SQLtnJtlCt>:Jn(l<.eq?cst) 
Figure 8-4 Error Page ,for SQL Injection 
8.1.2 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
The Cross-Site Scripting attack is also <ln injection flaw, which is one of th~ most critical 
and common Web application vulnerabilities detined by OWASP [16]. These flaws occLu· when 
an attacker uses a Web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a script, to 
different end user [6]. These vulnerabilities are quite widespread and occur when a Web 
application takes user input as output directly without validating it. 
Pattern-matching analysis is very efficient to detect Cross Site Script attack. Therefore, a 
rule to detect this type of attack is described in the following table: 
<Rcquest> 
<RequcstParam> 
<Namc>m. g<JNamc> 
<Valuc><SCR.lPT>alert(document.cookie);</SCRfPT><Naluc> 
</RcquestParam> 
<!Rcqucst> 
<SysRulc> 
<fD>Rule026<JJD> 
Figure 8~5 Request Parameter for XSS 
<Rul eName> XSS( RcqPos t)</RuleName> 
<Version> 1.0</Version> 
<Target>ReqPost</Target> 
<Pattcm>(&lt ;scripr&gt;j\.cookic)</Pattcrn> 
<CaseSensiti ve>n</CascSens itive> 
<Lcngth> 128</Lcngth> 
<RcfercnccNo>no</RcfcrcnccNo> 
</SysRulc> 
Figure 8-6 Rule for XSS 
2005-04-1 0 20:42:16,828 - Alcrt: ClientlJl: 127 .O. O. J ClientPort : 1334 ln tru~ ion Attempt detccted; XSS 
Figure 8·7 Intrusion Log for XSS 
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8.1.3 Directory Traversai 
Directory Traversai is another attack that breaks Web app lication input validation. "lt is an 
attempt to access files out§ide a {the Web document raot, or Jlles within the dQcument root, wl:ich 
are athervvise restricted ta thç user [1 [. " The primary target of directory traversai attack is the 
URL an attacker can manipulate to bypass the system access control. 
Both Pattern Matching Engine and URl modéling of Behavior Modeling Engine are able to 
detect Oirectory Traversai attack, For a possible directory traversai intrusion, the corresponding 
pattern-matching rule and intrusion log are illustrated as follows: 
<Request> 
<RequestParam> 
<Narne>File</Name> 
<Value>%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E<Yo2F</Value> 
<./RequestParam> 
</Rcqucst> 
Figure 8-8 Request Parameter for Directory Traversai 
<SysRule> 
<ID>RuleO 16</lD> 
<RuleName>Di rectoryTraversai (ReqPost)</RuleName> 
<Version> l .O<tV ersion> 
<Target>Req URI<rr arget> 
<Pattern>\.\.1</Pattcrn> 
<CaseSensit ive>n</CaseSens i ti vc> 
<Lengt.h> 128</Lcngth> 
<RcfcrcnccNo>no</RcfcrcnccNo> 
</SysRule> 
Figure 8-9 Rule for Directory Traversai 
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2005-04- 10 20:42:20,250- Alert Cli entTP : 1 27.0.0. J Clien tPort: 1334 'I ntrusion Attem pt de tec t~d : Di rectoryTraversal 
Figure 8-10 Intrusion log for Directory Traversai 
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8.1.4 Hidden Field 
Description 
Behaviour Modeling Engine can detect Directory Traversai effîçiently. Cross~S itc 
Scripting and SQL Injection Flaws can be detected if Paxameter profile is built correctly. 
However, only Behaviour Modeling Engine can stop Hidden Field manipulation attack 
effectively. 
::_JfTML can store field value~s_,Hidden Fields, which are not rendered to the_J...creen b)!. 
the browser but ÇQ]lected and submitted as parameter~· during submissisJ_r:J§._f.lL':- The attacker 
can save the source code for this HTML page, change the hidden field value or change its value 
by Proxy tools during the submission, and then post the newly changed value to the Web 
application. Thi s attack is dependent on the deviation from normal parameter value. Thus, only 
Behaviour Modeling Engine can raise an ala.rm when this exploitation occurs. 
Simulation 
During the learning mode, a parameter pro"ftle to describe the normal behaviour of this 
hidden field , Priee, can be established. Following table illustrate the legitimate profile in the 
data base. 
TypeiD TypeName ParamType 
1 Hidden 4999.99 
Table 8-1 Parameter Type for Hidden Field 
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Para miD ParmuName Type ID 
20 Priee 1 
Table 8-2 Parameter Prqfile for Hidden Field 
During the detection mode, we use the parameter name of this hidden field, priee, as a key 
to retrieve its legitimate parameter type. Then, the result 4999.99 can be gotten and a pattern 
represented with regular expression can be created conseguently. Thus, the deviation can be 
fo und by matching current malicious value with the legitimate profi le. 
And now an intrusion attempts to manipu late this hidden fie ld is demonstrated with of a 
Proxy tool, Paros [17]. The following fi gure illustrates this attack: 
' 
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' ' 
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6 GETh1 1PJiloca lhoot:B0301\N8bGoa~~lt ck?SCI0~1'1=129 HTTP/1.0 =~ HTIP/1.1 200 OK [0.016 s) 
1 PO Si illlp:.rimc alh ost:BOSOM!ebé oab'afuick H'I'TP/1.0 = >· r tl"rPI1 .1 .2 00 ü K [0.04 7 s)· ~ 
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''" 
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Figure 8-11 Manipulation of Hidden Field with Paros 
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The fo llowing figures illustrate the generat~d intrusion log and the error page that Web 
Agent returns to an attacker: 
2005-04-10 20:42:25,625 · Al err: CliemTP: 127.0.0. 1 ClientPort: 1334 Intrusion Attempt detccted: lnvalid pammeter type: [Priee o 1 J 
Figure 8-12 Intrusion Log for Hidden Field 
il'1JI stall.JS report: 
Req..Je>t was œ ·Jed, because of the fdlowh g rea son: 
The type of r.equested Parametff Vai:.Je : 1 is 1"\va~.dl 
R.~t was O::'f""ied, ' &âUSii' of th€! follow:rtg rea son: 
1i"te type of requested Pararnetr:r Va !Je : 1 ts nv~b:l! 
Figure 8-13 Error Page for Hidden Field 
8.2 Conclusion 
In this chapter, intrusion test cases to evaluate the effectiveness of this system arç discussed. 
These simulations demonstrate that the Intrusion Detection Framework for Web application 
proposed in the thesis can protect Web application against malicious attacks efficiently and 
effectively. 
---------------------------------
CHAPTER9 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
ln this chapter, the conclusion on this project is stJmmarized. Moreover, some 
recommendations or considerations for further research are also discussed here briefly. 
9.1 Conclusion of Thesis 
In this thesis, an Intrusion Detection framework for Web application with advanced 
detection algorithms, which is based on module architecture and comp;itible with J2EE 
development standard, is proposed. 
Advanced intn1sion detection algorithms, including Pattern Matching and Behavior 
Modeling, are adopted and extended. In the Pattern Matching Engine, new patterns can be easily 
developed with the XML-based configuration files. Behavior Mode)ing Engine can be easily 
configured and extended . A learning-based anomaly detection algorithm, Behavior Modeling, 
makes the detection of unknown attack possible. These methodologies and mechani.sms help this 
framework detect the complexas weil as simple intrus ion attempts efficiently and effectively. 
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A filter based Web Agent is designe.cl to be a pluggable embedded component within Web 
application. This allows us to easily deploy WebiDS agent into Web application without 
additional configuration. 
This thesis conducts experiments to evaluate this intrusion detection framework, These 
experiments successfully demonstrate th::tt this framework can detect various intrusions 
efficiently and effectively. 
9.2 Recommendation 
Som~ recommendations for the future works can be summarized as follows: 
• For Pattern Matching Analysis Engine, more rules or patterns have to be developed in orcier 
to detect more intrusion incidents successfully. 
• For Behavior Modeling A.nalysis Engine, more profiles used to describe HTTP request 
behavior should be considered. 
• For Behavior Modeling Analysis Engine, a more complex and advançed algoritJun could be 
developed to perform statistics analysis. So the statistics analysis can be used to measure 
whether current request is normal behavior or not more precisely. 
"' For Behavior Modeling Analysis Engine, more attributes of normal behavior cou ld be 
tested to mode! the normal behavior more precisely. The more accurately that normal 
behavior can be modeled, the less false positive or negative alm·ms will rise. More 
experiments should be donc to determine the proper attributes to mode! the behavior. 
• For Analysis Engine, a correlation algorithm used to measure the correctness of intrusion 
detection result should be considered. 
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• Other type of Web Agents could be developed to collect HTTP request data from other 
source, such as network Sniffer Agent. 
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